

## Potentials for interethnic integration and disintegration

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# Potentials for Interethnic Integration and Disintegration<sup>1</sup>

*Nikolai Genov*

## 1 Introduction

The following analysis and interpretation is based on the primary data from 156 in-depth interviews. They were carried out with successful representatives of the five ethnic groups studied within the framework of the InterEthno comparative research project<sup>2</sup> in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and Germany (Land Berlin). According to the organizational plan of the study, each national team was to carry out at least 30 in-depth interviews in the period between 01 October 2005 and 31 March 2006. In each country, the target group was to consist of the following 3 sub-groups: successful business people, politicians and representatives of the cultural elite of the ethnic group in the studied locality (nation-state or administrative unit of a nation-state).

No strict definition of “success” could be given in advance, since success has rather specific quantitative and qualitative parameters in the localities studied in the comparative project. A pragmatic approach was agreed upon for resolving the issue. The first group to be approached was the group of politicians who had their ethnic background in the group under study. They could be political representatives of this ethnic group or not. More important was the fact that they were clearly identifiable, since “success” could be directly connected to the position in elected bodies (parliaments, regional governments, community councils, etc.). Further on, the snowball technique was applied. The politicians approached first readily gave information about other successful representatives of the ethnic group active in politics, business and in cultural life. The successful business people approached in turn gave information about other successful politicians, business people, artists and university professors stemming from the same ethnic group. This information was cross-checked many times using various starting points for the “snowball” approach. The aim was to reach an optimal selection of truly successful representatives of the ethnic group confirmed as “successful” according to the local criteria by maximum number of available sources.

As a result of this preparatory process, each team produced a list of the 30 “most wanted” interviewees and nearly the same number of replacements. The national teams carried out the interviews in the vast majority of cases with their first choices interviews with the replacements were exceptions. The interviews took place under various conditions, but were conducted, in most cases, in the offices of the persons interviewed. There was no time limit set for the interviews. On average, they took 45-50 minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. There were no refusals to record the interviews, since the interviewers had all credentials from an international research project requiring the recording. The interviewers were typically members of the local scientific teams.

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1 Der Beitrag ist zuerst erschienen in: Genov, Nikolai (Ed.), *Patterns of Interethnic Integration*. Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin/Abteilung für Soziologie, 57/2007, pp. 34-42. ISSN 1424-419X

2 The INTAS Research Project 04-79-7018 (2005-2007) is coordinated by the author and involves national teams from Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and Germany.

The in-depth interviews are structured around three topics. The first one concerns the biography of the respondent and his/her family relations. The second topic is the relationship of the interviewed person to his/her ethnic group of origin. The third part of the interview consists of three projective questions (vignettes) requiring selection from among varying imaginary options. The first vignette involves the interviewee's choice of a collaborator from among representatives of five ethnic groups. The aim of the test is to establish the predominance of universalistic or ethnoparticularistic preferences in the selection of collaborators. The second vignette is intended to measure the intensity of the desire to have the mother tongue of the respondent designated as the officially dominant language in the locality. The third vignette aims at measuring the intensity of the desire to see the ethnic group to which the person belongs as the dominant ethnic group in the locality under scrutiny. In the analysis that follows, only primary data from the third part of the interview, i.e. only the elaborations on the three vignettes, are included.

The tool of the in-depth interview had to be conducted using quite different definitions of "locality" and on successful representatives of ethnic groups having a very different economic, political and cultural status in the locality.

## 2 Local Patterns of Interethnic Relationships

The five cases under scrutiny are indicative of a large variety of structural and value-normative patterns of interethnic relationships as well as of their dynamics.

*Tatarstan* already has a relatively stable tradition of autonomy within the framework of the Russian Federation. The strengthening of ethnic identity, cultural autonomy and the role of ethnic elites largely coincided with the *Perestroika* period in the Soviet Union in the eighties. As a result, *Tatarstan* declared sovereignty together with Chechnya in 1992. But unlike the Chechen political leadership, the leadership of *Tatarstan* managed to avoid violent interethnic clashes and to flexibly adapt its policies to accommodate rapidly changing conditions. The Republic currently enjoys the highest level of autonomy among all constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. The economic basis of the political autonomy is well developed. The standard of living is high relative to the conditions of the Russian Federation. There is a wide variety of options open to both the Tatar and the Russian ethnic elites and citizens of Tatar and Russian ethnic origin in the Republic. It appears as if political realism guides the acceptance of the geo-strategic situation and the existing administrative arrangements by all sides involved in the management of interethnic relations. Most likely, this will remain the case in the short run and probably in the medium and long run. This assumption is plausible today, but might be proven tomorrow by the decisions and actions of both the leadership of the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of *Tatarstan*. Changes in the management of the interethnic relations in *Tatarstan* might also be the outcome of broader regional or global processes.

Contrary to predictions concerning ethnic stratification in *Tatarstan*, predictions concerning *Crimea* should be made with care or, better yet, avoided. The peninsula is currently an Autonomous Republic in the Ukraine, which is actually defined as a Unitary state by its Constitution. The Russian ethnic domination on the peninsula is being increasingly challenged by the Crimean Tatars, who have already returned or are still returning from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Siberia, where they were deported in 1944. Tatars currently make out some 14 percent of the Crimean population, but the trend is toward an increase in the relative share of this ethnic group due to the continuing repatriation of

Tatars, their higher birth rate as compared to other ethnic groups on the peninsula and the decreasing but still continuing emigration of Russians from this Ukrainian territory. Despite having migrated back to the Crimea just recently, Tatars have the self-consciousness of being *the* autochthonous population of Crimea. They openly question the *status quo* by referring to their systemic deprivation in the economic, political and cultural sectors during the deportation. Given the difficulties facing the Crimean mono-cultural economy, the fragile arrangements between Russia and the Ukraine concerning the naval facilities of both countries on the peninsula, the political aspirations of the Crimean Tatars and the unstable situation in the Ukraine itself, stabilization or changes in the ethnic stratification on the Crimea might be initiated or supported by various domestic and international factors.

The same holds true for the *Autonomous Republic of Gagauzia* (Gagauz Yeri) in the framework of the Republic of Moldova. The autonomy of Gagauz Yeri came about in the context of violent clashes between the central government of Moldova and the separatist Transnistria during the first half of the nineties. However, economically and culturally, the population of this Autonomous Republic is more closely connected to Transnistria and to Russia than to Moldova, which is dominated by the Moldovan (Romanian) ethnic group. Since the Republic of Moldova has experienced a catastrophic economic decline during the transformation period and the prospect of economic recovery has been substantially delayed, the ensuing problems can be easily used and abused for the purposes of constructive or destructive ethnic policies. The unresolved issue of Transnistria and the yet unclear geo-strategic situation of the country also offer a variety of options for further changes.

Turks make out the largest traditional ethnic minority in *Bulgaria*. The group has experienced a variety of policies, ranging from strong support to strong suppression of their ethnic identity after the Second World War. The culmination of efforts to assimilate the ethnic minority was marked by the forceful change of the Turkish-Arabic names of the members of this ethnic group during the eighties. Against the background of this traumatic experience, there were widespread fears at the beginning of the political changes in the country that the development of a democratic political system and cultural pluralism might be endangered due to interethnic tensions and conflicts. This negative scenario was not unrealistic, as events in the Western Balkans clearly confirmed. But due to the ethnically sensitive politics of all domestic forces, the interethnic tensions have not yet materialized in interethnic clashes in the country. Moreover, the stabilization of its geo-strategic situation, together with the stabilization of the national economy and democratic politics, seems to have stabilized interethnic relations as well. Recent events indicate, however, that the interethnic relations are not that stable as they seem at first glance. Some nationalist elements have already mobilized with the goal of ethnicising politics. It is difficult to predict local developments in the process. However, given the experience of other members of the European Union, one might expect successful political management of the issues.

Turks represent a new, but already a rather numerous and well settled ethnic group in *Berlin*. However, it took decades before politicians officially recognized the existence of this ethnic group as an integral part of present day German society. Now, the time has come to openly discuss the achievements and the difficulties related to interethnic integration in the country. The issue has become a burning one in the context of the demographic development of the ethnic majority and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the German economy under the conditions of a growing proportion of population of non-German ethnic origin in the country. These challenges make the continuation of the liberal negligence of the acute problems or the spread of overoptimistic expectations about the in-

tegrating power of multiculturalism impossible.<sup>3</sup> Decisions and actions are very much needed in order to accelerate interethnic integration and to limit the possibilities for the spread of the phenomena of ethnic disintegration.

### 3 Desirable Future for Successful Representatives of Ethnic Minorities

The “vignettes” technique of projective questioning is particularly useful in interviews with competent and receptive persons who avoid evaluations of “is” situations, but are much more inclined to openly speculate about “could be” or “should be” situations related to a desirable future.

The first projective question reads as follows:

#### Vignette I

*Imagine you have to choose between five candidates for collaborators of yours – an American, Chinese, German, Russian and Tatar (or Turk, according to the country). They all have nearly the same professional qualification. Who would you choose? Why?*

Given the relatively stable economic, political and cultural situation at present in *Tatarstan* and the long tradition of interethnic cooperation between the Tatar and Russian ethnic groups there, one may assume the predominance of universalistic attitudes in the selection of collaborators by the representatives of the Tatar elite. In fact, professionalism and loyalty were particularly stressed by the respondents as criteria for the selection of individuals, without ethnic preferences or prejudices. Nevertheless, half of the respondents made their choice in favour of the imaginary Tatar collaborator because of the expected cultural affinity and potential for mutual understanding. This is obviously not a special issue in the communication with Russians since, *ceteris paribus*, one third of the successful representatives of the Tatar ethnic group interviewed would prefer to work with a Russian. Consistent with widespread positive stereotypes concerning punctuality, honesty and efficiency, there was an openly stated preference for a collaborator of German origin. Due to positive stereotypes of industriousness and accuracy, two of the interviewed persons made their choice in favour of a collaborator of Chinese ethnic origin. This openness to ethnic options is a certain sign for a general stability of the interethnic relations in *Tatarstan*, which limits the intensity of excessive preferences with regards to ethnic factors in the choice of collaborators.

One may assume that the complicated history of the *Crimean Tatars* after the Second World War and their unsettled economic and political situation would lead to their particularly strong focus on ethnic preferences. At the first glance, this is not the case, since one third of the representatives of the Tatar elite interviewed in *Crimea* definitely opted in favour of the professional qualities of the potential collaborator without ethnic preferences. This might be interpreted as an indicator of universalism. In reality, the situation is more complex, given the ethnic composition of the *Crimean peninsula*. The majority there are ethnic Russians. However, only two of the interviewed 32 representatives of the Tatar elites would eventually make a choice in favour of a collaborator of Russian origin. At the same time, half of the persons interviewed clearly opted in favour of a Tatar collaborator. Ethnic affinities

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3 See for instance: Luft, Stefan (2006) *Abschied von Multikulti. Wege aus der Integrationskrise*. Gräfelting: Resch.

and ethnic distances are openly defined. They would hardly support interethnic integration, at least in the short run.

In terms of specifics, the case of the successful *Gagauz* politicians, business people and representatives of the ethnic cultural elite turns out to be particularly intriguing. The autonomous republic of this ethnic group is situated within a society that is increasingly moving away from Russian political and cultural domination. *Gagauz* elites, however, definitely have a strong preference towards cooperation with persons of a Russian ethnic background. This option was selected by fourteen out of 32 interviewees from the *Gagauz* elites. Besides the strong affinity to an ethnic group with diminishing influence in Moldovan society, another striking finding is the low level of affinity to their own ethnic group. Deviating from the usual pattern, only one fifth of the *Gagauz* respondents would decide to collaborate with representatives of their own ethnic group. This fact might be interpreted as a strong preference towards universalistic (cosmopolitan) value-normative orientations. However, another possible explanation might be the relatively low level of cohesion within the ethnic group itself. If this assumption is correct, then the strong affinity to the Russian ethnicity should be interpreted as a very specific form of ethnocentrism. It is not focused on “our” ethnic group (the case of the Crimea Tatars) but on “another” ethnic group. The implications of this specific situation for the societal integration of Moldovan society present a special case for detailed studies further on.

One has to take into account the specifics of the local situation of Turks in *Bulgaria* in order to understand why the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites are represented the way they are in the interviews. Turks live predominantly in the rural areas of the country and generally have a lower level of education than ethnic Bulgarians. On the contrary, the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites are typically well educated, have extensive domestic and international experience and live in big cities, mostly in the capital city. Thus, it would be risky to generalize their preferences for collaboration in order to make a statement about the average preferences of the Turks living in Bulgaria, given their level of education and traditional habits. The choice in favour of a Turk from Turkey is also risky since the cultural differences between the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Turks living in Turkey are substantial, a fact openly stated by the interviewed persons. Thus, what remains as a clear regarding the choice made by the successful representatives of the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria is the stress on the professional qualities of the potential collaborator. More than the half of the respondents declared this type of universalistic preferences. The second most widely expressed preference was in favour of a collaborator of German origin, followed by the ethnic preference of Turks as collaborators. As in other cases (Moldova), the respondents noticed the lack of an option to collaborate with the ethnic majority in the country. As confusing as it is, the lack of this option has a clear background. It is the necessity to universalise the research tool.


While the Turks in Bulgaria represent a typical “old” (autochthonous) ethnic minority, Turks in the *Land Berlin* or in Germany as a whole represent a typical case of a “new” (allochthonous) ethnic group. The elites stemming from this group experienced the advantages and the limitations of universalism. It’s no wonder that the strongest preference (13 out of 30) was in favour of the professional and personal qualities of the potential collaborator without special ethnic preferences. Nevertheless, due to the specifics of the professional activity or other reasons, 5 would prefer an ethnic Turk and the same number would decide between a German and a Turkish collaborator according to their professional and personal qualities. Thus, the predominance of universalism is obvious, but ethnocentrism is also easy to detect. In the given context, there is one special issue which cannot be dealt with properly on the basis of the available primary information. One third of the interviewees whose country of



origin was Turkey turned out to ethnic Kurds. Thus, the preference towards universalism might have been influenced by the absence of the choice “Kurd” among the five suggested choices.

The schematic presentation of the above discussed preferences in the choice of collaborator appears as follows:

**Figure 1:** Ethnocentric or universalistic (cosmopolitan) preferences in the choice of a collaborator



## Vignette II

*Imagine you have the possibility to regulate the official language use here and now. Which language system would you choose: One official language (not yours), bilingual system (your native language being one of the two official languages) or your native language as the only official language? Why?*

Both the Russian and Tatar languages are state languages in *Tatarstan*. This is a constitutional solution according to the second option stated above. Since this is an achievement in the framework of the Russian Federation, the option is overwhelmingly seen as the only realistic, functional and desirable one in the local situation. Given the geo-strategic situation and the constitutional requirements of the Russian Federation, the third option above is not regarded as realistic and not even as desirable in terms of practical considerations for participation in the economic, political and cultural life of the Federation. However, in ideal terms and in the long run, sentiments about making the Tatar language the only state language in Tatarstan are also expressed. One of the reasons for this desire is the fear that the influence and the use of the Tatar language might steadily decline in the context of the dominant administrative and everyday use of the Russian language. This was signalled by only one tenth of the interviewed persons, but it has to be taken seriously. The recent history of the Baltic states shows how fast the turn from bilingualism towards mono-lingualism might come about.

The decision regarding personal preferences concerning the use of languages was particularly difficult for the representatives of the *Crimean Tatars*. With only two exceptions, they strongly advocate the official use of the Tatar language. At first glance, this does not seem to be an issue for discussion, since the official documents in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are usually published in Ukrainian, Russian and Tatar language. In reality, as it was particularly stressed in the interviews, the official use of the Tatar language comes as an exception. Thus, the acceptance of the legislative but not necessarily practical *status quo* actually signals a desire for the implementation of a real trilingualism. However, the current official regulation stipulating Ukrainian as a state language together with the Russian and the Tatar as official languages was openly questioned by seven out of 32 interviewed persons. They opted for the official use of Ukrainian and Tatar languages alone. Thus, beyond the predominant acceptance of the current situation, marked by the official dominance of the Ukrainian state language and the practical prevalence of the Russian language, one can recognise in-

fluent desires for change, which might have important cultural and political consequences for the autonomous Republic of Crimea in the framework of the Republic of Ukraine.


The language preferences of the *Gagauz* elites reveal a rather pragmatic approach to the issue. At the same time, the approach is problematic. Only one respondent would prefer a monolingual solution with the *Gagauz* language as the only official language. Given their affinity for collaboration with Russians, the widespread preference towards a bilingual solution raises sensitive questions about the desired second language (Russian or Moldavian). In practical terms, *Gagauz* typically have a good command of the Russian language and are considerably less proficient in the Moldavian state language. The choice in favour of trilingualism (*Gagauz*, Russian and Moldavian) raises even more complicated practical problems, since the policy of the Moldavian authorities is definitely focused on the use of the state language as the major or only means of communication. Thus, *Gagauz* people realistically abstain from insisting on a one language solution with the *Gagauz* language as the official language. However, they are facing difficult long-term choices in establishing a practically functioning bilingual system in the current environment of a strong administrative preference towards the Moldavian language. Undoubtedly, *Gagauz* society is facing tensions in resolving these issues in the current and will most probably face them in the future context of interethnic relations and societal integration.

Given the local traditions and current realities, there is no preference expressed on the part of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria for the domination of their ethnic language in the country. Even the bilingual option (Turkish as a second official language) is questioned because of local political and cultural considerations. They also take the sobering experience of other Balkan countries into account. Considerations about the professional development of the young generation determine the expressed preferences as well. It is typically assumed that younger people of Turkish origin would be disadvantaged provided they received their education predominantly in the language of the Turkish ethnic minority. Thus, the clearly predominant preference is towards the acceptance of the current status quo. It includes the recognition of the language of the Bulgarian ethnic majority as state language with an option for education in the languages of the ethnic minorities. This is a point of agreement and simultaneously a point of criticism, since the quality of education in Turkish language was subject of various critical remarks and suggestions on the part of several respondents.

With one somewhat exotic exception, the Turks (and Kurds) in *Berlin* unanimously accept the dominance of the German language. The option including official bilingualism with Turkish as a second language was not an issue for the interviewed persons. But half of the interviewed persons in *Berlin* stressed their desire to preserve their mother tongue, to use it actively as far as possible, and to pass it to the next generation. Moreover, they insist on the advantages of multilingualism. In addition, they notice in several cases the universalistic need to develop a good command of the English language, together with a command of the German and Turkish (Kurdish) languages.

The schematic presentation of the language preferences of the interviewed persons appears as follows:



**Figure 2:** Desirable domination of the ethnic language or acceptance of the *status quo***Vignette III**

*Imagine you could choose between your current situation and life in a sovereign state governed by your ethnic group. How strongly would you prefer the second situation – very strongly, strongly, to some extent, not at all? Why?*

The current legal regulation of the relationships between the Russian Federation and the Republic of *Tatarstan* is widely regarded as the greatest possible decentralization, both in Tatarstan and in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the establishment of the full sovereignty of Tatarstan is currently regarded as a utopian project, although the *Declaration of the State Sovereignty* of the Republic of Tatarstan (August 1990) might be regarded as a step in this direction. A number of agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan specified the meaning of the Declaration in terms which make the sovereignty an ideal rather than practical reality. This is the reason why just one fifth of the interviewed representatives of the Tatar elites hold this ideal as their personal preference. Seldom, but explicitly enough, rational calculation appears in their argumentation that real sovereignty would mean benefits for the interviewed person. Other representatives of the Tatar elite stress the potential benefits of sovereignty in the development of the ethnic traditions, language, education and culture.

Unlike the Tatars in Tatarstan, the *Crimean Tatars* refer to the obviously unstable situation when answering the question. The answers concerning the intensity of the desire to establish and maintain their political sovereignty are uncertain or include an unusually large number of seven “don’t know” answers. They cannot be clearly interpreted. On the one side, they might indicate real difficulties in defining the desirable future. However, it seems more realistic to assume that the interviewed persons would like to avoid clear answers to the question. Some of these answers might include visions about a sovereign Tatar state on the Crimean peninsula. This assumption is not just hypothetical. Seven interviewed persons openly opted for this preference of an independent Tatar state on the peninsula as a desirable future. Given the answers of one third of the respondents, in the sense that they would like to see an autonomous Tatar republic in the framework of the Ukraine, the picture becomes more transparent. The present day political situation on the Crimean peninsula is unmistakably unacceptable for the Tatar elites. They want and expect political changes strengthening their position as autochthonous population on the peninsula. More or less openly, they insist on their right to constitute their own statehood either on the basis of autonomy in the Ukraine or on the basis of full sovereignty. The level of acceptance of the current *status quo* is low. It is acceptable only on the condition that the Tatar ethnic group is still not prepared to take the political lead on the peninsula.

Only three of the interviewed representatives of the *Gagauz* elites insist on the political sovereignty of their ethnic group. The number is small, but it actually means one in ten. As seen from this point of


view, one might recognize some potential for political self-assertion in this rather small ethnic group. The realistic assessment of this potential leads the rest of the sample to the conclusion that the constitutionally achieved autonomy in the framework of the Republic of Moldova is currently sufficient. This assessment relies on the available information and cannot foresee geo-strategic developments which might change assessments, attitudes and behaviour.

The question about the potential political domination of the Turkish ethnic group puts the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites in Bulgaria in a difficult situation. They immediately refer to the option of living in a neighbouring country already dominated by their own ethnic group. The move to this neighbouring country is a matter of personal decision and thus solution to the problem indicated in Vignette III. Many ethnic Turks opted for this solution before or after the start of the democratic changes in Bulgaria. The Turks who remained in the country typically did so because of the decision to connect their own future and the future of their children with the development of a society in which they are in the ethnic minority. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that the interviewed persons would clearly opt for the domination of their ethnic group in this society. However, the option of moving to another society dominated by the Turkish ethnic group always remains open for them.

Successful Turks (and Kurds) in Berlin typically have personal histories of emigration from Turkey to Germany due to economic or political reasons. Only two of the interviewed persons were born in Germany. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the respondents from this ethnic group have made a choice about their country of residence. The obvious implication is that the option of a political system in the country of residence dominated by the immigrant's ethnic group is not a reasonable subject for discussion. Some wishes on the part of the Kurdish immigrants to live in a state dominated by their own ethnic group do not refer to Germany as their current country of residence but to the desirable sovereign Kurdish state, which does not exist.

The schematic presentation of the preferences of the elites concerning the political domination of their ethnic group appears as follows:

**Figure 3:** Desirable political domination of one's own ethnic group or acceptance of the political status quo



#### 4 Concluding Remarks

The first conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis of desires and preferences is obvious: the analysis is confronted with rather specific local cases. This applies to all three imaginary choices - to the preferences concerning the ethnic origin of the preferred collaborator, the desirable status of the language of the ethnic group and the desirable status of the ethnic group of origin of the respondent.

Another obvious conclusion concerns the dynamics of the local situations. Some of them tend to reproduce stability in interethnic integration while others bear the potential for changes in the local ethnic stratification.

In all projective situations (*Figures 1 to 3*), the balance between the extremes seems to be best achieved at present in the Republic of Tatarstan. So far, this is the case that best corresponds to the idea of interethnic integration (the middle position on the three scales). In fact, in terms of the internal arrangements regarding interethnic relations in the republic and of the status of the ethnically defined political unit Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, there are good prospects for a further strengthening of the constructive and for reduction of the destructive potentials in interethnic integration. Roughly said, this is a “win-win” situation marked by the “Potential for cooperation” because of trends towards the structural desegregation of ethnic groups and the strengthening of universalistic attitudes among the participants in the interethnic interaction.<sup>4</sup> We characterize this pattern of interethnic integration as inclusive. However, no trend or solution to the problems of interethnic integration can be totally satisfactory for all participants, since the issues involved are rather sensitive. Thus, each “win-win” situation can be only “the second best” in the given context and does not preclude trends deviating from the pattern of sustainable economic, political and cultural development.

In the case of the Crimean Tatars, one may notice indications of uncertainty and of latent or manifest conflicts. The common trauma of the deportation and the difficulties of the new arrangements in Crimea have brought about a strengthening of the collective ethnic identification of Crimean Tatars to an extent that might easily bring about both constructive and destructive consequences concerning interethnic integration. The representatives of this ethnic group definitely keep to ethnic preferences in the selection of collaborators. This is a signal for both a possible self-imposed, structural ethnic segregation and for particularistic value-normative orientations. Taken together, both characteristics mark a trend towards interethnic tensions and conflicts.<sup>5</sup> The predominant tendency among the Tatars on the Crimean peninsula is to accept the officially supported trilingualism, but with reservations. On the one side, this tendency is based on the desire for the practical implementation of the official regulations involving the Tatar language in administrative communication. On the other side, the reservations are a result of the desire for a gradual upgrading of the status of the Tatar language to the position of the second most important language of communication in Crimea after the state language Ukrainian. Given the present day predominance of the Russian language in the everyday and official communication in Crimea, the materialization of the linguistic desires of some representatives of the Tatar elite would imply substantial changes in the cultural situation on the peninsula. The same holds true for the explicitly articulated desire to reach a situation in which the Tatar ethnic group would become the dominant ethnic group on the peninsula. We describe this pattern of desirable development of the interethnic relations as *exclusive*. In this particular case, we might realistically expect tensions and conflicts in the course of the change in ethnic stratification of the population of Crimea.<sup>6</sup>

4 See Genov, Nikolai, Comparing Patterns of Interethnic Integration in: Genov, Nikolai (Ed.), Patterns of Interethnic Integration. Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin/Abteilung für Soziologie, 57/2007, Figure 1, Area A.

5 See *ibid.*, Area B

6 See the schematically presented mechanisms of this type of change in Comparing Patterns of Interethnic Integration in: Genov, Nikolai (Ed.), Patterns of Interethnic Integration. Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin/Abteilung für Soziologie, 57/2007, Figure 2

The situations of the Turkish ethnic groups in Bulgaria and in Land Berlin are rather different and quite similar in the same time. They are rather different, since the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria is constitutionally recognized as an autochthonous ethnic minority. The Turks are new migrants to Berlin. However, the statements by successful representatives of both groups provide evidence that their realistic strategy is mostly focused on adjustment to the linguistic predominance of the language of the ethnic majority and to the ethnic dimensions of the political *status quo*. In both cases, there is a clear rational calculation lurking behind this strategy, which we describe as *adaptive*. The rational calculation in question concerns the personal and collective prospects for development in countries that are members of the European Union and promise economic, political and cultural stability despite some outbreaks of xenophobia.

The situation of the Gagauz ethnic group manifests still another pattern of managing interethnic relations. The substantial autonomy of the Gagauz people in Moldova is currently fully satisfactory for them. However, it was achieved in a precarious context for the Moldovan statehood due to the conflict in Transnistria. The conflict is not yet settled and there are continuing uncertainties concerning the stability of the Moldovan statehood. But this situation of uncertainty cannot continue forever. Whatever the future solutions, they will reflect on the forms and the prospects of Gagauz autonomy. In other words, it will have to be adapted to new circumstances, which can hardly be influenced by the forces of the Gagauz autonomy itself. Thus, we are dealing with a case of *reflexive* management of the problems and prospects of the interethnic integration.

The above typology of patterns of interethnic integration will be tested and developed further on the basis of the analysis of other individual cases.

## **Zur Person**

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